Low-cost truthful multicast in selfish and rational wireless ad hoc networks

It is conventionally assumed that all wireless devices will follow the prescribed routing protocols without any deviation. However, the scarcity of resources in wireless devices raises a concern about this assumption. Most often, instead of faithfully following the protocols, the owners of wireless devices will try to manipulate the protocols for their own benefits. We specifically study the multicast in selfish and rational wireless ad hoc networks. By assuming that each wireless node has a private cost of forwarding data for other nodes, we first give an efficient method to construct a multicast tree, namely VMST, whose cost is a 5-approximation of the optimum multicast tree's cost for homogeneous wireless networks. We then design a truthful payment scheme that pays minimum for any relay node among all truthful payment schemes based on VMST.

[1]  Y. Shoham,et al.  Truth revelation in rapid, approximately efficient combinatorial auctions , 2001 .

[2]  Jerry R. Green,et al.  Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods , 1977 .

[3]  Srdjan Capkun,et al.  Self-organization in mobile ad hoc networks: the approach of Terminodes , 2001, IEEE Commun. Mag..

[4]  David S. Johnson,et al.  The prize collecting Steiner tree problem: theory and practice , 2000, SODA '00.

[5]  William Vickrey,et al.  Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders , 1961 .

[6]  Markus Jakobsson,et al.  A Micro-Payment Scheme Encouraging Collaboration in Multi-hop Cellular Networks , 2003, Financial Cryptography.

[7]  Joan Feigenbaum,et al.  A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing , 2002, PODC '02.

[8]  Xiang-Yang Li,et al.  Truthful low-cost unicast in selfish wireless networks , 2004, 18th International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium, 2004. Proceedings..

[9]  Joan Feigenbaum,et al.  Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions , 2001, J. Comput. Syst. Sci..

[10]  Samir Khuller,et al.  Improved Methods for Approximating Node Weighted Steiner Trees and Connected Dominating Sets , 1998, FSTTCS.

[11]  Xiang-Yang Li,et al.  Low-cost routing in selfish and rational wireless ad hoc networks , 2006, IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing.

[12]  J.-P. Hubaux,et al.  Enforcing service availability in mobile ad-hoc WANs , 2000, 2000 First Annual Workshop on Mobile and Ad Hoc Networking and Computing. MobiHOC (Cat. No.00EX444).

[13]  E. H. Clarke.  Multipart pricing of public goods , 1971 .

[14]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[15]  Noam Nisan,et al.  Algorithmic Mechanism Design , 2001, Games Econ. Behav..

[16]  Yoav Shoham,et al.  Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions , 2002, EC '99.

[17]  Samir Khuller,et al.  Approximation Algorithms for Connected Dominating Sets , 1996, ESA.

[18]  David P. Williamson,et al.  A general approximation technique for constrained forest problems , 1992, SODA '92.

[19]  Levente Buttyán,et al.  Stimulating Cooperation in Self-Organizing Mobile Ad Hoc Networks , 2003, Mob. Networks Appl..