Analysis of security protocols for authentication in distributed systems

Research works on the analysis and the development of authentication protocols frequently adopt the linear software development approach and are based on certain non-extensible assumptions (Tobler and Hutchison 2004), (Grob 2003), (Harbitter and Menasce 2002). This paper is part of an ongoing work regarding the development of a pre-emptive security mechanism for networks and distributed systems. We present in this paper a cyclic analytical method of protocol development for authentication solutions, which can be used by both designers and security administrators. Our analytical approach can be extended to a variety of protocols for either closed or open networks. The method lends itself to the analysis and therefore to the development and/or adoption of authentication protocols that can render computing resources unassailable to attackers. The motivation for this approach stems from the fact that despite the multiplicity of highly published protocols for authentication, an amazing number of attacks continue to evolve against authentication solutions, and thereby continue to hinder the placement of trust on networked computing resources.

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