Laboratory Tests of Formal Theory and Behavioral Inference

Political scientists seek to answer questions about political behavior, institutions and outcomes. Why do (or do not) people cooperate to achieve common goals? To what extent do elections induce politicians to follow the wishes of the public? Why is government unable to enact new laws demanded by popular majorities? At the most general level, the method of advancing scientific knowledge of politics involves developing theories and testing their predictions. Theories are often expressed in terms of models that are purposeful, abstract simplifications of the real world, and formal theory involves a set of concepts and methods for systematically constructing and analyzing mathematical models.

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