Board Composition from Adolescence to Maturity: A Multitheoretic View

We develop theory to show how board composition and, consequently, firm performance are a reflection of both the firm's life cycle stage and the relative power of the CEO and external financiers at the time of founding. This theory provides insight into the predictive validity of agency, resource dependence, institutional, and social network theories. We also argue that boards are subject to path dependency, and, thus, board composition is likely to persist over time.

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