Formal Verification of Cardholder Registration in SET

The first phase of the SET protocol, namely Cardholder Registration, has been modelled inductively. This phase is presented in outline and its formal model is described. A number of basic lemmas have been proved about the protocol using Isabelle/HOL, along with a theorem stating that a certification authority will certify a given key at most once. Many ambiguities, contradictions and omissions were noted while formalizing the protocol.

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