Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Lars Stole,et al. Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.
[2] Glenn Ellison,et al. Are some mutual fund managers better than others , 1999 .
[3] Steven N. Kaplan,et al. Outside directorships and corporate performance , 1990 .
[4] Peter Tufano,et al. Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows , 1998 .
[5] Kevin J. Murphy,et al. Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence , 1991, Journal of Political Economy.
[6] P. Robinson. ROOT-N-CONSISTENT SEMIPARAMETRIC REGRESSION , 1988 .
[7] Sheridan Titman,et al. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance , 1997 .
[8] Anne T. Coughlan,et al. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation , 1985 .
[9] Sheridan Titman,et al. Adverse risk incentives and the design of performance-bases contracts , 1989 .
[10] Kevin J. Murphy. Incentives, learning, and compensation: a theoretical and empirical investigation of managerial labor contracts , 1986 .
[11] A. Khorana,et al. Top management turnover an empirical investigation of mutual fund managers , 1996 .
[12] Jeffrey Zwiebel,et al. Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation , 1995, Journal of Political Economy.
[13] F. Modigliani,et al. Alternative Investment Performance Fee Arrangements and Implications for SEC Regulatory Policy , 1975 .
[14] B. Malkiel. Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991 , 1995 .
[15] Laura T. Starks,et al. Performance Incentive Fees: An Agency Theoretic Approach , 1987, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
[16] Steven J. Huddart,et al. Reputation and performance fee effects on portfolio choice by investment advisers 1 I am grateful fo , 1999 .
[17] Bengt Holmstrom,et al. Herd Behavior and Investment , 2022 .
[18] E. Lazear,et al. Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts , 1979, Journal of Political Economy.
[19] Anat R. Admati,et al. Does It All Add Up? Benchmarks and the Compensation of Active Portfolio Managers , 1997 .
[20] Paul A. Gompers,et al. An analysis of compensation in the U.S. venture capital partnership 1 Helpful comments were provided , 1999 .
[21] W. McEnallyRichard,et al. Cross-Sectional Variation in Common Stock Returns , 1992 .
[22] Owen A. Lamont. Macroeconomic forecasts and microeconomic forecasters , 2002 .
[23] Richard A. Ippolito. Consumer Reaction to Measures of Poor Quality: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry , 1992, The Journal of Law and Economics.
[24] Lawrence M. Kahn,et al. Contingent Pay and Managerial Performance , 1990 .
[25] J. Chevalier,et al. Herding over the career , 1999 .
[26] W. Rogers. Regression standard errors in clustered samples , 1994 .
[27] Richard J. Zeckhauser,et al. Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: Short‐Run Persistence of Relative Performance, 1974–1988 , 1993 .
[28] E. Fama. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm , 1980, Journal of Political Economy.
[29] Boyan Jovanovic. Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover , 1979, Journal of Political Economy.
[30] S. Morris. An Instrumental Theory of Political Correctness , 1998 .
[31] John C. Groth,et al. Security Analysts , 1978 .
[32] Jeffrey D. Kubik,et al. Security Analysts' Career Concerns and Herding of Earnings Forecasts , 1998 .
[33] M. Weisbach. Outside directors and CEO turnover , 1988 .
[34] Jerold B. Warner,et al. Stock prices and top management changes , 1988 .
[35] William N. Goetzmann,et al. Do Winners Repeat? , 1994 .
[36] Glenn Ellison,et al. Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives , 1995, Journal of Political Economy.
[37] Kent D. Daniel,et al. NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES EVIDENCE ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CROSS SECTIONAL VARIATION IN STOCK RETURNS , 1996 .
[38] M. Berkowitz,et al. Incentives and Efficiency in the Market for Management Services: A Study of Canadian Mutual Funds , 1993 .