论文信息 - Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms

Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms

We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form. These equivalent conditions are stated in terms of the ranks of two matrices constructed from the original game form.

Peter Sudhölter | Francisco Marhuenda | Cristian M. Litan

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