A Theory of Bank Capital
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Mathias Dewatripont,et al. A theory of debt and equity: diversity of securities and manager-shareholder congruence , 1994 .
[2] Kenneth N. Kuttner,et al. Are There Bank Effects in Borrowers' Costs of Funds? Evidence from a Matched Sample of Borrowers and Banks* , 2002 .
[3] Allen N. Berger,et al. The role of capital in financial institutions , 1995 .
[4] Jean Tirole,et al. Private and Public Supply of Liquidity , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.
[5] René M. Stulz,et al. Rethinking Risk Management , 1996, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.
[6] Raghuram G. Rajan,et al. Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt , 1992 .
[7] R. Rajan,et al. What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data , 1994 .
[8] R. Rajan,et al. Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor , 1995 .
[9] R. Rajan,et al. FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE, AND GROWTH , 2001 .
[10] Douglas W. Diamond,et al. Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications , 2000 .
[11] R. Rajan,et al. Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis , 1998 .
[12] Stephen A. Ross,et al. Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation , 1990 .
[13] Oliver Hart,et al. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts , 1998 .
[14] Philip H. Dybvig,et al. Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity , 1983, Journal of Political Economy.
[15] Raghuram G. Rajan,et al. Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking , 1999, Journal of Political Economy.
[16] Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications , 2001 .
[17] Franklin Allen,et al. Optimal Financial Crises , 1998 .
[18] Paul M. Horvitz,et al. Perspectives on Safe and Sound Banking. , 1986 .
[19] Cheolbeom Park. Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts , 2000 .
[20] Douglas W. Diamond. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring , 1984 .
[21] E. Kane. Three paradigms for the role of capitalization requirements in insured financial institutions , 1995 .
[22] R. Townsend. Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification , 1979 .
[23] Douglas W. Diamond,et al. Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking , 1998 .
[24] Kathryn E. Spier,et al. Capital Structure as a Bargaining Tool: The Role of Leverage in Contract Renegotiation , 1993 .
[25] M. C. Jensen,et al. THEORY OF THE FIRM: MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR, AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE , 1976 .
[26] O. Hart,et al. Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt , 1997 .
[27] O. Hart,et al. A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital , 1991 .
[28] Albert M. Wojnilower. The Central Role of Credit Crunches in Recent Financial History , 1980 .
[29] J. Tirole,et al. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector , 1997 .
[30] R. Rajan. Why Bank Credit Policies Fluctuate: A Theory and Some Evidence , 1994 .
[31] M. Flannery. Debt maturity and the deadweight cost of leverage: optimally financing banking firms , 1994 .
[32] Douglas W. Diamond. Should Japanese Banks Be Recapitalized , 2001 .
[33] Merton H. Miller. Do the M & M propositions apply to banks? , 1995 .
[34] J. Stein,et al. An Adverse Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy , 1995 .
[35] S. Myers,et al. The Paradox of Liquidity , 1995 .
[36] Gary B. Gorton,et al. Bank Capital Regulation in General Equilibrium , 1995 .
[37] Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden,et al. Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors , 1994 .
[38] Patrick Bolton,et al. Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors , 1996, Journal of Political Economy.
[39] Robert C. Merton,et al. THEORY OF RISK CAPITAL IN FINANCIAL FIRMS , 1993 .