Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

We study behavioral implementation under incomplete information. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementing choice correspondences in ex-post equilibrium. Our results provide natural analogs of the results in Bergemann and Morris (2008) and De Clippel (2014).

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