Electoral Accountability and the Provision of Public Goods in Rural China

This article examines the impact of electoral accountability on the level of public goods provision in Chinese villages. By conducting a nationwide village-level survey and estimating two simultaneous equations, we find that in villages where Villagers’ Committee elections are implemented more in line with the rules and procedures stipulated in the 1998 Organic Law of Villagers’ Committees, where the elected villagers’ committee and/or its chair is conferred with more authority to manage and allocate village public funds, and where there is a democratic election of the party branch secretary, the levels of village government investment in public goods provision are higher. Our findings also pinpoint the tension in reconciling the empowered participatory local governance with Party-state control. JEL Classification Codes: D02, D71, H41, P35.

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