Gorbachev's Struggle For Economic Reform: The Soviet Reform Process, 1985-88. By Anders Aslund. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989. Tables. $38.50, cloth; $12.95, paper.

Anders Aslund's goal in this book is to concentrate on the reform process and on how four qualitatively different groups of measures were put in place. The reform process is seen as part of his examination of changes in the traditional economic framework, enterprise autonomy, central planning functions, and policies toward cooperatives and private enterprise. Living in Moscow from November 1984 to August 1987 gave Aslund the opportunity to consult economists, administrators, and other professionals in different levels and sectors of the Soviet economy. Combined with his detailed coverage of the Soviet press, the result is a comprehensive chronology of reform beginning with April 1985 and ending with October 1988. Most useful for the general reader is the six-page analysis of biases associated with various Soviet published sources and research institutes. Aslund's survey of major Soviet publications and research institutes gives a baseline to his interpretations of various reform proposals and initiatives. His analysis of the reform process in the Soviet economy starts with a concise, well-written description of why the 1965 economic reform failed, followed by a thoughtful and thorough explanation of why economic reform is back on the political agenda, and why, because of the social contract, necessary changes will be difficult to implement. Third, inspired by George Breslauer's work and using alternative models of economic reform proposed by Joseph Berliner, Aslund offers interesting insights into various political leaders' stances on reform. As radical reformers, he includes Mikhail Gorbachev, Aleksandr Iakovlev, Edvard Shevardnadze, Vadim Medvedev, A. Luk'ianov, and Georgii Razumovskii. Engineers and technocrats who favor reforms that maintain a prominent role for Gosplan include Nikolai Ryzhkov, Sliunkov, and Iu. Masliukov. Those who favor a technocratic rationalization of the Soviet economy along the lines practiced by the former GDR include Lev Zaikov and Sergei Solov'ev. Supporting the reactionary program he has Egor Ligachev. Those who support change to preserve the existing structure include Viktor Shcherbitskii, V. Dolgikh, V. Nikonov, V. Chebrikov, and V. Vorotnikov. The strength of this book is that Aslund shows how the blend of these many voices shows up in compromises that tend to undermine the effectiveness of any single reform proposal and, further, tend to block any comprehensive reform program. This book is an excellent reference on the early stages of the reform process.