Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms ∗

We present a new condition on beliefs that guarantee the Bayesian implementability of all efficient social decision rules. We show that this condition is easy to verify and is both more interpretable and more general than the conditions that are found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.

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