The Supply Side of Congressional Redistricting: Race and Strategic Politicians, 1972-1992

The goal of empowering minorities through redistricting has been attacked from all sides. The Supreme Court recently called the North Carolina redistricting plan "political apartheid" (Shaw v. Reno 1993) while critics on the left reject the approach because it merely provides descriptive rather than substantive representation (Guinier 1991a, 1134-53). This article offers a new perspective from which to assess the viability of this approach to black empowerment: the supply side of redistricting. Using a unique data set from the 1972, 1982, and 1992 congressional elections in black districts, we examine how individual politicians respond to the changing electoral context imposed by new district lines and how, in turn, their decisions shape the electoral choices and outcomes in a given district. We argue that individual politicians acting in their own self-interest may tip the balance of electoral power to black and white moderates in the district. We find that this outcome prevails in approximately half of the new districts electing candidates who embody a "politics of commonality." This finding runs counter to the fear of the Supreme Court and others that new minority districts promote "political apartheid."