A DYNAMICAL MODEL OF TERRORISM

This paper develops a dynamical model of terrorism. We consider the population in a given region as being made up of three primary components: terrorists, those susceptible to both terrorist and pacifist propaganda, and nonsusceptibles, or pacifists. The dynamical behavior of these three populations is studied using a model that incorporates the effects of both direct military/police intervention to reduce the terrorist population, and nonviolent, persuasive intervention to influence the susceptibles to become pacifists. The paper proposes a new paradigm for studying terrorism, and looks at the long-term dynamicalevolutionintimeofthesethreepopulationcomponentswhensuchinterventions are carried out. Many important features—some intuitive, others not nearly so—of the nature of terrorism emerge from the dynamical model proposed, and they lead to several important policy implications for the management of terrorism. The different circumstances in which nonviolent intervention and/or military/police intervention may be beneficial, and the specific conditions under which each mode of intervention, or a combination of both, may be useful, are obtained. The novelty of the model presented herein is that it deals with the time evolution of terrorist activity. It appears to be one of the few models that can be tested, evaluated, and improved upon, through the use of actual field data.

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