The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology the Need to Explain

How do reasoners deal with inconsistencies? James (1907) believed that the rational solution is to revise your beliefs and to do so in a minimal way. We propose an alternative: You explain the origins of an inconsistency, which has the side effect of a revision to your beliefs. This hypothesis predicts that individuals should spontaneously create explanations of inconsistencies rather than refute one of the assertions and that they should rate explanations as more probable than refutations. A pilot study showed that participants spontaneously explain inconsistencies when they are asked what follows from inconsistent premises. In three subsequent experiments, participants were asked to compare explanations of inconsistencies against minimal refutations of the inconsistent premises. In Experiment 1, participants chose which conclusion was most probable; in Experiment 2 they rank ordered the conclusions based on their probability; and in Experiment 3 they estimated the mean probability of the conclusions' occurrence. In all three studies, participants rated explanations as more probable than refutations. The results imply that individuals create explanations to resolve an inconsistency and that these explanations lead to changes in belief. Changes in belief are therefore of secondary importance to the primary goal of explanation.

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