Assortative matching and search with labor supply and home production

We extend the search-matching model of the marriage market of Shimer and Smith (200) to allow for labor supply and home production. We characterise the steady-state equilibrium when exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. We study nonparametric identification using cross-section data on wages and hours worked, and we develop a nonparametric estimator. The estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state flow conditions are strongly increasing in male and female wages. We estimate the expected share of marriage surplus appropriated by each spouse as a function of wages. The model allows to infer the specialisation of female spouses in home production from observations on wages and hours worked.

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