CYBER-POWER SYSTEM ANALYSIS USING A REAL TIME TEST BED

By Ceeman Brightson Vellaithurai, M.S. Washington State University July 2013 Chair: Anurag K. Srivastava The Electric Power System (EPG) has been identified as one of the most critical infrastructure that is considered to be vulnerable to cyber-physical attacks. With the emphasis on making the grid “smarter”, there have been an increase in the deployment of several smart devices in the power grid, and automation of the power system has received a major investments. It is necessary to consider the interdependencies of cyber and physical networks for cyber-power system analysis with increasing automation. Applications and algorithms developed for the smart grid need to be tested and evaluated using an integrated cyberphysical test bed. This work relates to cyber-power system analysis using developed real time test bed utilizing the Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) and Network Simulator 3 (NS3) supported by other software and hardware resources. Integration of network simulator with power system simulator indicates that communication links are generally not a bottleneck for wide area monitoring and control. Results from the simulation of an Aurora type of attack on a generator using the test bed indicate that the generator is likely to suffer mechanical damage, if the attack is successful. Real time simulation results for micro-grid reconfiguration and voltage stability of transmission grid using the developed cyber-physical test bed provides insight for implementation of these specific applications.

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