Reciprocity, Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Kevin McCabe,et al. On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games , 1996 .
[2] V. Smith. Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science , 1982 .
[3] P. Richerson,et al. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups , 1992 .
[4] V. Smith,et al. Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games , 1994 .
[5] W. MacLeod,et al. Gift Giving and the Evolution of Cooperation , 1997 .
[6] Catherine C. Eckel,et al. Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games , 1996 .
[7] R. Kranton. Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining System , 1996 .
[8] T. E. S. Raghavan,et al. Structure of equilibria inN-person non-cooperative games , 1974 .
[9] L. Cosmides,et al. Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. , 1992 .
[10] Joyce E. Berg,et al. Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History , 1995 .
[11] M. Rabin. Published by: American , 2022 .
[12] V. Smith,et al. Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games: Reply , 1999 .
[13] V. Smith,et al. Behavioral foundations of reciprocity: experimental economics and evolutionary psychology , 1998 .
[14] J. Horowitz,et al. Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments , 1994 .
[15] E. Kalai,et al. Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium , 1993 .
[16] S. Baron-Cohen. Mindblindness: An Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind , 1997 .
[17] L. Cosmides. The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task , 1989, Cognition.
[18] L. Cosmides,et al. The Adapted Mind , 1992 .