Representing Utility Functions via Weighted Goals

We analyze the expressivity, succinctness, and complexity of a family of languages based on weighted propositional formulas for the representation of utility functions. The central idea underlying this form of preference modeling is to associate numerical weights with goals specified in terms of propositional formulas, and to compute the utility value of an alternative as the sum of the weights of the goals it satisfies. We define a large number of representation languages based on this idea, each characterized by a set of restrictions on the syntax of formulas and the range of weights. Our aims are threefold. First, for each language we try to identify the class of utility functions it can express. Second, when different languages can express the same class of utility functions, one may allow for a more succinct representation than another. Therefore, we analyze the relative succinctness of languages. Third, for each language we study the computational complexity of the problem of finding the most preferred alternative given a utility function expressed in that language.

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