The Institutions of Regulation: An Application to Public Utilities

37 p. ; 30 cm. Documento de trabajo (Universidad de San Andres. Departamento de Economia) ; 67. "Marzo 2004" Incluye referencias bibliograficas (p. 31-37).

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