Shuffler: Mitigate Cross-VM Side-Channel Attacks via Hypervisor Scheduling

Cloud computing relies on resources sharing to achieve high resource utilization and economy of scale. Meanwhile, contention on shared resources opens doors for co-located virtual machines (VMs) to have negative impacts on each other, and even introduces vulnerabilities such as information leakage. For example, via CPU cache-based side-channel attacks, an attacker VM can extract crypto keys from a victim VM.

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