论文信息 - Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems

Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems

We consider the problem of allocating houses to agents when monetary compensations are not allowed. We present a simple and independent proof of a result due to Ehlers and Klaus (Int J Game Theory 32:545–560, 2004) that characterizes the class of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, resource monotonicity and nonbossiness.

Onur Kesten | Onur Kesten

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