论文信息 - The VCG Auction in Theory and Practice

The VCG Auction in Theory and Practice

We describe two auction forms for search engine advertising and present two simple theoretical results concerning i) the estimation of click-through rates and ii) how to adjust the auctions for broad match search. We also describe some of the practical issues involved in implementing a VCG auction.

H. Varian | Christopher Harris

[1] D. Gale,et al. The Strategy Structure of Two Sided Matching Markets , 1985 .

[2] D. Gale,et al. Multi-Item Auctions , 1986, Journal of Political Economy.

[3] Alvin E. Roth,et al. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis , 1990 .

[4] M. Rothkopf,et al. Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? , 1990, Journal of Political Economy.

[5] Lawrence M. Ausubel,et al. The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction , 2004 .

[6] H. Varian. Online Ad Auctions , 2009 .

[7] Michael P. Wellman,et al. Economic reasoning and artificial intelligence , 2015, Science.

[8] Nicola Gatti,et al. Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities , 2012, Artif. Intell..

[9] Ning Lu,et al. A Privacy-Preserving Online Reverse Multi-attributes Auction Scheme Based on Degree-Matching , 2016, ICCCS.

[10] Peter B. Key,et al. Efficient Advert Assignment , 2014, Oper. Res..

[11] Tyler Cowen,et al. A Skeptical View of the National Science Foundation's Role in Economic Research , 2016 .