A COGNITIVE MODEL OF AUTOMATISMS AND BREAKDOWNS

GOAL-ORIENTED Before being someone who plans, man is someone who acts. Because planning often intervenes in case of uncertainty or failures in activity, the planning process must be understood as an intermediary intermittent contribution to the success of actions unfolding. An important part of man behaviour does not need any symbolic mental representation beyond the "just-perceived-environment" with which man interacts. Breakdowns are cognitive occurrences due to sudden ruptures in sensory-motor automatisms that are usually adapted to a situation. They COD3titute a preliminary way to understand in what circumstances an actor is really engaged in symbolic problem solving. This symbolic thinking however is entirely dependent on the breakdown context. In the cognitive model proposed in this paper, what happens before a breakdown is based on a PDP matching with automatic scripts followed by a procedural execution of the selected automatic script. Concerning the PDP developments, a simple model grounded in a multi-layer architecture architecture and capable of bottom-up and to)HJown inferences will replicate the deductive and inductive mechanisms of recognition processes. Concerning the execution of the automatic scripts, we will try to justify why a hierarchical goal-oriented structure is still needed. The major part of this paper discusses the simulation of six types of breakdowns and analyses the motivations for such an enterprise both from a cognitive and an AI perspective.

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