An Introduction to Game Theory for Linguists

In a very general sense we can say that we play a game together with other people whenever we have to decide between several actions such that the decision depends on the choice of actions by others and on our preferences over the ultimate results. Obvious examples are card games, chess, or soccer. If I am to play a card to a trick, then it depends on the cards played by my playing partners whether or not I win the trick. Whether my move in chess leads to a win usually depends on the subsequent moves of my opponent. Whether I should pass the ball to this or that team member depends not in the least on my expectations about whether or not he will pass it on to a player in an even more favourable position. Whether or not my utterance is successful depends on how it is taken up by its addressee and the overall purpose of the current conversation. This provides the basis for applications of game theory in pragmatics.

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