COOPERATIVE GAMES : CORE AND SHAPLEY VALUE

This article describes the basic elements of the cooperative approach to game theory, one of the two counterparts of the discipline. After the presentation of some basic definitions, the focus will be on the core and the Shapley value, two of the most central solution concepts in cooperative game theory. JEL classification: C7.

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