Incentive regulation, service quality, and standards in U.S. electricity distribution

The widespread use of incentive regulation in telecom, electricity, and other industries in the U.S. and elsewhere has raised questions about its possible adverse effect on the quality of service. This paper examines U.S. electricity distribution utilities in the years 1993–1999, several of which were subject to incentive regulation. Controlling for other possible influences, including possible endogeneity of the regulatory regime, the data and model indicate that incentive regulation is indeed associated with significantly longer duration of service outages, although not necessarily more frequent outages. Importantly, this quality reduction is offset in cases where regulation incorporates service quality standards. We also examine the causal chain connecting incentive regulation, cost expenditures, and service quality. We conclude that careful design of quality standards can allow incentive regulation to achieve cost savings without quality degradation.

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