On the Complexity of Game Isomorphism

We consider the question of when two games are equivalent and the computational complexity of deciding such a property for strategic games. We introduce three types of isomorphisms depending on which structure of the game is preserved: strict, weak, and local. We show that the computational complexity of the game isomorphism problem depends on the level of succinctness of the description of the input games but it is independent of the way the isomorphism is defined. Utilities or preferences in games can be represented by Turing machines (general form) or tables (explicit form). When the games are given in general form, we show that the game isomorphism problem is equivalent to the circuit isomorphism problem. When the games are given in explicit form, we show that the game isomorphism problem is equivalent to the graph isomorphism problem.

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