Putnam’s No-Miracle Argument: A Critique

More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since Hilary Putnam first proposed his famous ‘no-miracle’ argument in ‘What is mathematical truth?’ (1975). The argument, also known as the ‘ultimate argument’ (van Fraassen 1980), is still widely discussed and is considered by many to be, just as Putnam believed, the major argument in favour of scientific realism (Leplin 1997, Psillos 1999). In this paper, I will review various forms of the argument and show them to be unconvincing from a naturalist’s point of view. My main point is that scientific realism is indefensible when it is conceived to be a scientific explanation of the success of science. This is not because other — ’better’ — explanations are available or because the no-miracle argument is logically flawed or because examples of false empirically successful theories can be produced. It is rather because scientific realism is a philosophical position and cannot possibly count as a scientific explanation of any fact. Essentially, I want to question the scientific explanatory force of truth and, at the same time, argue against a form of naturalism which construes scientific realism as a scientific hypothesis.