On the role of side information in strategic communication

This paper analyzes the fundamental limits of strategic communication in network settings. Strategic communication differs from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since it involves different objectives for the encoder and the decoder, which are aware of this mismatch and act accordingly. This leads to a Stackelberg game where both agents commit to their mappings ex-ante. Building on our prior work on the point-to-point setting, this paper studies the compression and communication problems with the receiver and/or the transmitter side information setting. The equilibrium strategies and the associated costs are characterized for the Gaussian variables and quadratic cost functions. Several questions on the benefit of side information in source and joint source-channel coding in such strategic settings are analyzed. Our analysis has uncovered an interesting result on optimality of uncoded communication in strategic source-channel coding in the presence of receiver side information.

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