On the impact of global information on diffusion of innovations over social networks

This paper studies how global information affects the diffusion of innovations on a network. The diffusion of innovation is modeled by the logit dynamics of a weighted N-person coordination game among (bounded) rational users where innovations spread through users' strategic choices. We find a critical asymptotic threshold for the weight on global information where the diffusion of innovations undergoes a transition in the rate of convergence regardless of any network structure. In particular, it is found that the convergence to the pervasive adoption is slowed down by global information.

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