论文信息 - An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form

An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form

In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form (not necessarily with side payments) obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors is bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.

Anindya Bhattacharya | Victoria Brosi

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