Strategic Defense and Attack of Complex Networks

This article shows how policy choices about defense and attack investments at the component level can be made for arbitrarily complex networks and systems. Components can be in series, parallel, interdependent, interlinked, independent, or combinations of these. Investments and utilities are determined for the defender and attacker dependent on their unit costs of investment and contest intensity for each component, and their evaluations of the value of system functionality.

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