论文信息 - Individual manipulability of majoritarian rules for one-dimensional preferences

Individual manipulability of majoritarian rules for one-dimensional preferences

Abstract The degree of individual manipulability of majoritarian aggregation procedures is evaluated for the case of one-dimensional positioning of alternatives and agents. The calculation of the degree of manipulability is performed for 3-5 alternatives. We find that the group of rules dominates all others in terms of the lowest share of all manipulable profiles, and for some extensions gives even the zero level manipulability.

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