Individual manipulability of majoritarian rules for one-dimensional preferences
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Fuad Aleskerov | Daniel Karabekyan | Vyacheslav Yakuba | Alexander Ivanov | F. Aleskerov | V. Yakuba | D. Karabekyan | A. Ivanov
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