Multiple explanation: A consider-an-alternative strategy for debiasing judgments.

Previous research has suggested that an effective strategy for debiasing judgments is to have participants consider the opposite. The present research proposes that considering any plausible alternative outcome for an event, not just the opposite outcome, leads participants to simulate multiple alternatives, resulting in debiased judgments. Three experiments tested this hypothesis using an explanation task paradigm. Participants in all studies were asked to explain either I hypothetical outcome (single explanation conditions) or 2 hypothetical outcomes (multiple explanation conditions) to an event ; after the explanation task,. participants made likelihood judgments. The results of Studies I and 2 indicated that debiasing occurred in all multiple explanation conditions, including those that did not involve the opposite outcome. Furthermore, the findings indicated that debiased judgments resulted from participants' spontaneous consideration ofadditional alternatives in making their likelihood judgments. The results of Study 3 also identified the perceived plausibility of the explained alternative as an important moderating variable in debiasing.

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