Why representation(s) will not go away: crisis of concept or crisis of theory?

A treatment of the notion of ‘representation’ requires philosophical, conceptual, and empirical arguments (Goodman 1981 [1968]; Rorty 1980; Jorna 1990). Philosophical and conceptual arguments are always involved because the choice of concepts often presupposes a philosophical position. In addition, discussions about ‘representation’ and, especially, the so-called ‘crisis of representation’ are subject to fads and fashions. However, in our view, there can never be a crisis of ‘representation’, just as there can be no crisis of weather or crisis of the atom. It is true that a crisis in the interpretation of representation or in the operationalization of this notion may be at issue, but such an interpretation must be clearly formulated and elaborated. We believe that there is a philosophical debate on the notion of ‘representation’, but we also believe that ‘representations’ have a steady empiricalconstructivist side that will continue to exist as long as knowledge and human cognition exist. Let us begin with a few general remarks on ‘representation’. We postulate the equivalence of the concepts of representation, symbol, and sign and support the classical tenet that representation means ‘aliquid stat pro aliquo’. On these premises, we will discuss the major positions in the debate on the crisis of representation. We will then go into the details of various aspects of ‘representation’, such as its characterization in terms of predication, various features of the notion of representation, and the relation between representation, knowledge, and human cognition. After the discussion of these analytical and conceptual aspects of our topic, the constructivist-empirical domain of representations will be dealt with in the light of our present research, the CASTOR Project, which deals with innovation and knowledge change in members of organizations. As our present CASTOR research shows, knowledge in organizations is really knowledge of human cognition and representations.

[1]  Herbert A. Simon,et al.  On the Forms of Mental Representation , 1978 .

[2]  A. Newell Unified Theories of Cognition , 1990 .

[3]  René J. Jorna,et al.  Toward a Semiotic Theory of Cognitive Dynamics in Organisations , 1999 .

[4]  H. Gardner,et al.  The Mind's New Science , 1985 .

[5]  Göran Rossholm,et al.  Languages of Art , 1998 .

[6]  S. Kosslyn Image and mind , 1982 .

[7]  Bart Nooteboom,et al.  Towards a cognitive theory of the firm: issues and a logic of change , 1996 .

[8]  Guus Schreiber,et al.  Knowledge Engineering and Management: The CommonKADS Methodology , 1999 .

[9]  Zenon W. Pylyshyn,et al.  Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation for Cognitive Science , 1984 .

[10]  F. D. Saussure Cours de linguistique générale , 1924 .

[11]  S. Chipman The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness , 1990, Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience.

[12]  J. Derrida De la grammatologie , 1967 .

[13]  Allen Newell,et al.  Human Problem Solving. , 1973 .

[14]  René Jorna,et al.  A comparison of presentation and representation: linguistic and pictorial , 1988 .

[15]  Alex M. Andrew,et al.  Computation and Cognition: Towards A Foundation for Cognitive Science, by Zenon W. Pylyshyn, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., xxiii + 292 pp., £26.15 , 1985, Robotica.

[16]  R.J.J.M. Jorna Knowledge management really is about representations , 1998 .

[17]  D. Smith Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature , 1981 .

[18]  R. Rorty,et al.  Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. , 1980 .

[19]  C. Hartshorne,et al.  Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce , 1935, Nature.

[20]  P. Devlieger,et al.  Mental retardation in American film: A semiotic analysis , 2000 .

[21]  Michel Klein,et al.  Expert systems - a decision support approach with applications in management and finance , 1990, Insight series in artificial intelligence.

[22]  John R. Anderson,et al.  Learning and Memory: An Integrated Approach , 1994 .

[23]  U. Eco,et al.  Meaning and Mental Representations , 1988 .