The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management

Abstract The impact of inequality on the ability of human groups to undertake successful collective action is investigated with special reference to overexploitation of common property resources. In voluntary provision problems, on the one hand, inequality has an ambiguous impact on the feasibility of the efficient outcome even though better endowed agents contribute more to collective action. In regulated settings, on the other hand, inequality tends to reduce the acceptability of available regulatory schemes and, therefore, to make collective action more difficult.

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