论文信息 - Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions

Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions

We study merging, in a few senses, of two measures when increasing sequence of information is observed. Motivating this extension of Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) work, are studies of convergence to equilibrium in infinite games and in dynamic economies.

Ehud Kalai | Ehud Lehrer | E. Kalai | E. Lehrer

[1] Ehud Lehrer,et al. Merging Economic Forecasts , 1990 .

[2] E. Kalai,et al. Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games , 1993 .

[3] M. Schervish,et al. An approach to consensus and certainty with increasing evidence , 1990 .

[4] Dov Monderer,et al. Stochastic Common Learning , 1995 .

[5] D. Blackwell,et al. Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information , 1962 .

[6] E. Kalai,et al. Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium , 1993 .

[7] D. Freedman,et al. On the consistency of Bayes estimates , 1986 .