CREATIVITY AND CAPACITY FOR REPRESENTATION: WHY ARE HUMANS SO CREATIVE?

Creativity depends on using our mental processes to create novelty. However fornovelty to be creative it must be effective. either in some practical sense. or in that it establishes a coherent set, where no relations. or a less coherent set of relations. existed before. Creativity may be defined. therefore. as the creation of effective novelty through the operation of our mental processes. It is a truism that human beings are the most creative systems we know. They are more creative than any machines invented so far. They are also more creative than other animals. and they become more creative as they develop. This is not to say that children are not creative. but the power of creative processes generally increases with development. Our problem then is to ask what it is about adult humans that confers on them such unique creative power.

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