Uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness

Significance Human prosociality presents an evolutionary puzzle, and reciprocity has emerged as a dominant explanation: cooperating today can bring benefits tomorrow. Reciprocity theories clearly predict that people should only cooperate when the benefits outweigh the costs, and thus that the decision to cooperate should always depend on a cost–benefit analysis. Yet human cooperation can be very uncalculating: good friends grant favors without asking questions, romantic love “blinds” us to the costs of devotion, and ethical principles make universal moral prescriptions. Here, we provide the first evidence, to our knowledge, that reputation effects drive uncalculating cooperation. We demonstrate, using economic game experiments, that people engage in uncalculating cooperation to signal that they can be relied upon to cooperate in the future. Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject’s choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love.

[1]  David G. Rand,et al.  Third-party punishment as a costly signal of trustworthiness , 2016, Nature.

[2]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[3]  Valerio Capraro,et al.  To Know or Not to Know? Looking at Payoffs Signals Selfish Behavior, But It Does Not Actually Mean So , 2016 .

[4]  M. Tomasello,et al.  The roots of human altruism. , 2009, British journal of psychology.

[5]  T. Yamagishi,et al.  Social exchange and reciprocity: confusion or a heuristic? , 2000, Evolution and human behavior : official journal of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society.

[6]  M. Clark,et al.  Interpersonal attraction in exchange and communal relationships. , 1979 .

[7]  M. Milinski,et al.  Reputation helps solve the ‘tragedy of the commons’ , 2002, Nature.

[8]  Joseph Henrich,et al.  The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion: credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution , 2009 .

[9]  J. Silk,et al.  The role of tracking and tolerance in relationship among friends , 2012 .

[10]  R. Frank Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions , 1990 .

[11]  Valerio Capraro,et al.  To Know or Not to Know? Looking at Payoffs Signals Selfish Behavior, But It Does Not Actually Mean So , 2015, ArXiv.

[12]  G. Brady Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action , 1993 .

[13]  K. Vohs,et al.  Case Western Reserve University , 1990 .

[14]  David G. Rand,et al.  Human cooperation , 2013, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[15]  R. Boyd,et al.  Explaining altruistic behavior in humans , 2003 .

[16]  M. Schlossberg Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. , 1990 .

[17]  H. Gintis,et al.  Costly signaling and cooperation. , 2001, Journal of theoretical biology.

[18]  Q. Atkinson,et al.  Beliefs about God, the afterlife and morality support the role of supernatural policing in human cooperation , 2011 .

[19]  David G. Rand,et al.  Fast but Not Intuitive, Slow but Not Reflective: Decision Conflict Drives Reaction Times in Social Dilemmas , 2015, Journal of experimental psychology. General.

[20]  P. Richerson,et al.  Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups , 1992 .

[21]  M. Zeelenberg,et al.  Decision time as information in judgment and choice , 2014 .

[22]  David G. Rand,et al.  Risking Your Life without a Second Thought: Intuitive Decision-Making and Extreme Altruism , 2014, PloS one.

[23]  C. Rusbult,et al.  Development of prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations: theory and preliminary evidence. , 1997, Journal of personality and social psychology.

[24]  A. Zahavi Altruism as a Handicap: The Limitations of Kin Selection and Reciprocity , 1995 .

[25]  Attila Szolnoki,et al.  Coevolutionary Games - A Mini Review , 2009, Biosyst..

[26]  D. Sperber,et al.  A mutualistic approach to morality: the evolution of fairness by partner choice. , 2013, The Behavioral and brain sciences.

[27]  D. Sperber,et al.  Moral Reputation: An Evolutionary and Cognitive Perspective , 2012 .

[28]  Martin A. Nowak,et al.  Cooperate without Looking in a Non-Repeated Game , 2015, Games.

[29]  W. Hamilton,et al.  The evolution of cooperation. , 1984, Science.

[30]  M. Crockett,et al.  Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments. , 2016, Journal of experimental psychology. General.

[31]  Ara Norenzayan,et al.  Like a camera in the sky? Thinking about God increases public self-awareness and socially desirable responding , 2012 .

[32]  A. Evans,et al.  The effects of observed decision time on expectations of extremity and cooperation. , 2017 .

[33]  C. D. De Dreu Human Cooperation , 2013, Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society.

[34]  David G. Rand,et al.  Social heuristics shape intuitive cooperation , 2014, Nature Communications.

[35]  David G. Rand,et al.  Promoting cooperation in the field , 2015, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences.

[36]  Jenifer Z. Siegel,et al.  Harm to others outweighs harm to self in moral decision making , 2014, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[37]  M. Nowak Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation , 2006, Science.

[38]  David G. Rand,et al.  Spontaneous giving and calculated greed , 2012, Nature.

[39]  David G. Rand,et al.  Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation , 2016, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.

[40]  P. Richerson,et al.  The evolution of indirect reciprocity , 1989 .

[41]  Clayton R. Critcher,et al.  How Quick Decisions Illuminate Moral Character , 2013 .

[42]  R. Boyd,et al.  Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem , 2004, Nature.

[43]  D. Kahneman A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. , 2003, The American psychologist.

[44]  Peter Salovey,et al.  Asymmetry in Judgments of Moral Blame and Praise , 2003, Psychological science.

[45]  R. Trivers The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism , 1971, The Quarterly Review of Biology.

[46]  Geoffrey M. Hodgson,et al.  Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation , 2005 .

[47]  Brad J. Sagarin,et al.  An Ethical Approach to Peeking at Data , 2014, Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science.

[48]  J. Henrich,et al.  Culture–gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the emergence of human prosociality , 2011, Trends in Cognitive Sciences.

[49]  A. Zahavi Mate selection-a selection for a handicap. , 1975, Journal of theoretical biology.

[50]  Ernst Fehr,et al.  Rethinking fast and slow based on a critique of reaction-time reverse inference , 2015, Nature Communications.

[51]  T. Yamagishi,et al.  Is behavioral pro-sociality game-specific? Pro-social preference and expectations of pro-sociality , 2013 .

[52]  M. Nowak,et al.  Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do , 2015, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.