Security policies in Nizza on top of L4.sec

Declaration I declare to have written this work independently and without using unmentioned sources. Erklärung Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich diese Arbeit selbstständig erstellt und keine anderen als die angegebenen Hilfsmittel benutzt habe. Task formulation Within the scope of the diploma thesis, the management of different security policies on top of the microkernel L4.sec has to be evaluated. The resulting work will be part of a Trusted Computing Base software, which is under development. Therefore, it has to be compatible to this software. The following problems are of particularly interest for the exploration: How can a capability-based system be designed, so that it supports all imaginable security policies? In such a system, how can users and resources be mapped to names and identities of the platform? The work has to include a prototypical implementation, as well as an evaluation of the design , regarding complexity and generality. Acknowledgment First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor Christian Helmuth, who helped me with answering a lot of questions, in finding design weaknesses and by giving me the freedom to develop my own ideas. Thanks goes to Norman Feske for his tirelessly work on Bastei and the support he spend to me. Furthermore, I'm thankful to Marcus Völp, for discussions about different policy models and Thomas Kriegelstein, who gave me hints on existing, theoretical work. The practical part of my work wouldn't exist without the patient answers of Christian Oschwald to my C++ questions. Also, I'd like to thank Sandro Merbd and the Conni e.V., who inspired the scenario in the design part. Finally, I want to thank Hermann Härtig for facilitating the whole work, by establishing a research group with such a creative and pleasant working-atmosphere.

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