Security Games Applied to Real-World: Research Contributions and Challenges

The goal of this chapter is to introduce a challenging real-world problem for researchers in multiagent systems and beyond, where our collective efforts may have a significant impact on activities in the real-world. The challenge is in applying game theory for security: our goal is not only to introduce the problem, but also to provide exemplars of initial successes of deployed systems in this problem arena. Furthermore, we present key ideas and algorithms for solving and understanding the characteristics large-scale real-world security games, and then present some key open research challenges in this area.

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