Partner Choice and the Marital College Premium

Several theoretical contributions have argued that the returns to schooling within marriage play a crucial role for human capital investments. Our paper empirical investigates the evolution of these returns over the last decades. We consider a frictionless matching framework a la Becker-Shapley-Shubik, in which the gain generated by a match between two individuals is the sum of as ystematic effect that only depends on the spouses’ education classes and a match-specific term that we treat as random; following Choo and Siow (2006), we assume the latter component has an additively separable structure. We derive a complete, theoretical characterization of the model. We show that if the supermodularity of the surplus function is invariant over time and errors have extreme value distributions, the model is overidentified even if the surplus function varies over time. We apply our method to US data on individuals born between 1943 and 1972. Our model fits the data very closely; moreover, we find that the deterministic part of the surplus is indeed supermodular and that, in line with theoretical predictions, the “marital college premium” has increased more for women than for men over the period.

[1]  A. Siow,et al.  Estimating a marriage matching model with spillover effects , 2006, Demography.

[2]  Robert D. Mare,et al.  Trends in educational assortative marriage from 1940 to 2003 , 2005, Demography.

[3]  Bryan S. Graham,et al.  Chapter 19 - Econometric Methods for the Analysis of Assignment Problems in the Presence of Complementarity and Social Spillovers1 , 2011 .

[4]  Jeremy T. Fox Identification in matching games , 2009, BQGT.

[5]  A. Galichon,et al.  Matching with Trade-Offs: Revealed Preferences Over Competing Characteristics , 2009, 2102.12811.

[6]  Jeremy T. Fox Estimating Matching Games with Transfers , 2008 .

[7]  Maristella Botticini,et al.  Are There Increasing Returns in Marriage Markets , 2008 .

[8]  Lawrence F. Katz,et al.  The Race Between Education And Technology , 2008 .

[9]  R. Mare EDUCATIONAL ASSORTATIVE MATING IN TWO GENERATIONS , 2008 .

[10]  P. Chiappori,et al.  Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market , 2006, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[11]  A. Siow,et al.  Who Marries Whom and Why , 2006, Journal of Political Economy.

[12]  M. Yorukoglu,et al.  Engines of Liberation , 2003 .

[13]  Lawrence F. Katz,et al.  The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions , 2002, Journal of Political Economy.

[14]  S. Hoffman A Treatise on the Family , 2000 .

[15]  J. Dagsvik Aggregation in Matching Markets , 2000 .

[16]  R. Michael Abortion Decisions in the U.S , 1999 .

[17]  Y. Weiss,et al.  Match Quality, New Information, and Marital Dissolution , 1997, Journal of Labor Economics.

[18]  R. Mare Five decades of educational assortative mating. , 1991 .

[19]  T. Bergstrom,et al.  Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods , 1983 .

[20]  G. Becker,et al.  A Treatise on the Family , 1982 .

[21]  G. Becker A Theory of Marriage: Part II , 1974, Journal of Political Economy.

[22]  G. Becker Chapter Title: a Theory of Marriage a Theory of Marriage , 2022 .

[23]  D. McFadden Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior , 1972 .

[24]  L. Shapley,et al.  The assignment game I: The core , 1971 .