论文信息 - A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality

A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality

We consider private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We show that the uniform rule is the only allocation rule satisfying Ω-continuity, no-envy, and one-sided resource-monotonicity. This result strengthens a characterization of the uniform rule due to Thomson (Soc Choice Welf 11:205–223, 1994).

Lars Ehlers | L. Ehlers | Lars Ehlers

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