Launch Under Attack to Redress Minuteman Vulnerability?

I Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has noted that even if the Soviet Union develops the capability to destroy U.S. Minuteman silos, the Soviets cannot be certain that they can therefore destroy missiles. Accordingly, the development of the ability to destroy silos does not necessarily represent any net change in the Soviet ability to destroy other targets of value in the United States or, for that matter, to reduce the amount of destruction the United States can inflict on targets of value in the Soviet Union. This lack of assurance that Minuteman missiles could in fact be destroyed could clearly be very important under certain circumstances, and it is the purpose of this paper to explore, in greater depth than has been publicly available, both technical and policy aspects of the ability to launch ICBMs "under attack" or "on impact."' On the other hand, so long as the U.S. Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) force is in fact invulnerable, and our cruise missiles and their carriers can penetrate Soviet air defense, whether Minuteman Re-entry Vehicles (RVs) survive to be launched may make little difference to the Soviet Union or to the United States. Each reader will no doubt have individual views on this point. Some, including the author, although advocating increasing the durability of our system of ICBM basing, have emphasized at the same time the desirability of a clear capability to launch under attack, in order to diminish in the minds of Soviet leaders any possible benefits from a massive strike at the U.S. ICBM force, and so further redye the chance that the Soviet Union would launch such a strike. Given the likelihood that no basing system for ICBMs will at all times be judged perfectly durable by all viewers (i.e., prelaunch survivability = l .O) , the ability to launch under attack could further