Government Incentives when Pollution Permits are Durable Goods

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of pollution taxesversus pollution permits for a budget oriented Government.Pollution permits are analyzed as durable goods, and apollution tax is seen as being equivalent to leasing outpollution permits. First, a general model is developed, andthen four stylized types of Government are discussed (abenevolent dictator, a pure Leviathan, a green and a business-friendly Government). We show that all types of Governmentprefer a pollution tax system, but this regime is notnecessarily the best in social welfare terms. The intuition isthat a tax or leasing system makes it easier for theGovernment to credibly commit to the budget maximizing levelof pollution permits which is good for Government revenues,but not necessarily for social welfare.

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