Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Richard P. McLean,et al. FULL EXTRACTION OF THE SURPLUS IN BAYESIAN AND DOMINANT STRATEGY AUCTIONS , 1988 .
[2] E.E.C. van Damme,et al. Games with imperfectly observable commitment , 1997 .
[3] Philippe Aghion,et al. RENEGOTIATION DESIGN WITH UNVERIFIABLE INFORMATION , 1994 .
[4] Jeffrey C. Ely,et al. Implementation with Near-Complete Information , 2003 .
[5] Sanford J. Grossman,et al. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration , 1986 .
[6] R. Gibbons,et al. Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining , 1988 .
[7] Muhamet Yildiz,et al. A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements , 2007 .
[8] E. Maskin. Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality , 1999 .
[9] J. Laffont,et al. Implementation, Contracts, and Renegotiation in Environments With Complete Information , 1992 .
[10] Eric Maskin,et al. Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts , 1999 .
[11] D. Fudenberg,et al. Interim Correlated Rationalizability , 2007 .
[12] N. Meyers,et al. H = W. , 1964, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.
[13] David M. Kreps,et al. On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements , 1988 .
[14] Eric Maskin,et al. Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature , 1999 .
[15] O. Hart,et al. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm , 1988, Journal of Political Economy.
[16] John. Moore,et al. Subgame Perfect Implementation , 1988 .
[17] Takashi Kunimoto,et al. Implementation with near complete information: The case of subgame perfection , 2009 .
[18] D. Fudenberg,et al. Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty , 1990 .
[19] Yeon-Koo Che,et al. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting , 1999 .
[20] R. Myerson. Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information , 1982 .
[21] Tilman Börgers,et al. Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge , 1994 .
[22] R. Zeckhauser,et al. Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case , 1990 .
[23] D. Monderer,et al. Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs , 1989 .