The wrath of the fairness-primed negotiator when the reciprocity norm is violated

Abstract Prior research has demonstrated that buyers primed to think of fairness are more cooperative in price negotiations. This research was based on the seller responding in accordance with the norm of reciprocity. The present research supports these results, but shows that when sellers do not reciprocate the buyer's cooperative behavior, fairness-primed buyers act to punish the seller. They retaliate by becoming radically competitive. Priming a concern for fairness appears to sensitize negotiators to social concerns. They act more fairly and more emotionally and demand fair treatment in return. They are, therefore, both more cooperative when their opponent reciprocates and less cooperative — seemingly even vindictive — when their opponent does not.

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