Abstract This study examined the effects of communication, feedback, and identifiability on behavior in a simulated commons. To do this, 64 mixed-sex groups of four introductory psychology students participated in a commons dilemma simulation for 50 trials or until the group exhausted the commons pool. Half of the groups played under a free communication condition, while the other half were prohibited from communicating. Half of the groups in both communication conditions received visual feedback about the amount of the commons' resource (money) which remained after each trial while the other half received no feedback. Finally, half of the groups in each of these four conditions were made highly identifiable by the use of the name tags and feedback about the choices of each player. The remaining groups were assigned to a low identifiability condition in which no name tags were used, no feedback given and group members were separated by wooden dividers to prevent visual contact. Results showed that groups having the opportunity for resource feedback or for communication achieved greater total money harvests and maintained the commons for a greater number of trials than groups having neither. As expected, the largest totals and longest commons maintenance were achieved by groups having both. Identifiability had no influence on the length of commons maintenance except when there was neither resource feedback nor communication opportunities. When both were unavailable, groups in the high identifiability condition harvested more money and maintained the commons longer.
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