Red light for Green Paper : The EU policy on energy efficiency

The EU Green Paper on energy efficiency calls for action to decrease energy use and thus achieve increased competitiveness, fulfil the environmental targets and increase security of supply. In this comment, we examine the role the EU Commission suggest that energy efficiency, and policies supporting energy efficiency, takes. The policies and the suggestions are qualitatively elaborated upon in the light of the goal of a common European electricity market. We suggest that the rationales for the energy efficiency measures are weak, and that the suggested goals of increased competitiveness, environmental targets, and security of supply are best reached with the direct measures especially designed for each goal. Some of the energy efficiency measures may counter-act other direct policies. Further, The Green Paper measures may prove detrimental to the European Electricity market insofar as the policies suggested could lead to a policy fatigue among the electricity consumers.

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